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NATIONAL EMERGENCY STRIKES AND
PUBLIC INTEREST*
BENJAMIN C.

SIGAL**

What is the "public interest" in relation to the problem of strikes
and their settlement in the United States today? When does the public
interest become involved in labor disputes? I suggest that, in our preoccupation with the consequences of interruptions in production of goods
and services, we are wont to generalize much too loosely about the public interest and to invoke the mystic power of that term much too freely.
Having made that general indictment, it behooves me to prove my
innocence by defining the concept of public interest as it relates to
strikes and their settlement. I conceive this public interest to consist
of a bundle of elements, which I express, for the sake of convenience,
in the form of beliefs.
First, we believe that self-organization of employees in unions of
their own choosing is a desirable thing and that collective bargaining
should be actively encouraged. We have expressed this belief in a number of laws, both state and federal. We are fond of saying, and I think
most of us deeply believe, that free trade unions are a strong bulwark
of democracy.
Second, we believe in the right of employees to strike and of employers to lockout their employees. These rights are part of our democratic heritage. We consider it involuntary servitude to require one
private individual to work for another private individual against his
will, no matter how generous the compensation. Furthermore, it is
generally recognized that the right to strike is an integral part of the
collective bargaining process. Equality at the bargaining table means
more than equality of verbal facility or equality in technical skill. It
means equality in economic power-the power to withhold services on
the one hand and employment on the other.
Third, we believe in the maintenance of the free enterprise system in
its basic essentials. I shall not presume to define that system except in
this negative fashion: it is an economic system in which the state does
not exercise a controlling influence over economic policy, and particularly, intervenes to only a very limited extent in determining general
wage and price policies. This definition leaves much to the imagination,
* This paper was read at the Round Table on Labor Law at the meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools, in Cincinnati, Ohio, on December 28, 1948.
** Member of the Washington, D. C., bar; counsel for various labor unions.
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but for our purposes it is precise enough. It is only in war emergencies, and their immediate aftermath, that the majority of the people
of this country is willing to transfer to the state extensive controls
over basic elements of our economic life, such as the determination
of fair profits, prices, wages, and even the right to work or to set up a
business. The violence and generality of the reaction in the post-war
period against the so-called regimentation of the war-period is still
fresh and vivid in our minds. The modification of, or if you please,
the encroachments upon, the free enterprise system which occur in time
of peace, come only slowly and after bitter struggles.
The fourth element is the interest in attaining and maintaining economic stabilization and maximum production. This is an interest which
has become prominent particularly since the war. It is expressed, for
example, in the Employment Act of 1946.1 One aspect of this interest
is that the production of goods and services essential to the health and
safety of the public shall not be interrupted.
These, then, are what I consider the principal elements of the public
interest in the strike problem. It is the interaction of these factors which
has determined the general attitude toward the treatment of strikes, at
least for the last generation, and will probably continue to do so for
some time to come.
All work stoppages resulting from labor disputes involve the public
interest. So far as the great majority of these stoppages is concerned,
there can be no doubt that the public interest requires that there be no
governmental intervention aimed at terminating them by compulsion.
Such intervention would be contrary to each of the beliefs I previously
named. First, it would gravely impair the effectiveness of collective*
bargaining. If the parties to the bargaining process know in advance
that they cannot eventually resort to a test of economic strength, there can
be no real bargaining. The development of responsibility in labor-management relations, of the growth of a spirit, as well as the fact, of
cooperation between labor and management, is impossible when the government sooner or later takes matters out of the hands of the contestants.
Secondly, the right to strike is obviously illusory if the threat to
strike, or the strike itself, is the signal for the government to step in to
postpone or halt the stoppage.
Third, the prohibition of strikes requires, sooner or later, the introduction of compulsory arbitration. This means, inevitably, government
control of wages, which brings with it government control of prices and
other elements in our economic life. In short, the prohibition of work
stoppages in general must quickly lead to a major change in our way
1 60 STAT.

23-25, Feb. 20, 1946, 15 U. S. C. A. §§1021-1024.
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of life. Such a change, at least at the present time, would be contrary
to the desires of the great majority of our people.
Fourth, most stoppages do not seriously interfere with the supply of
essential goods and services, and do not threaten the health or safety of
the public. Very few strikes can noticeably affect the level of production or threaten the stability of our economy. The disputants can test
their strength as long as they wish and their individual struggles will
cause scarcely a ripple in the economic life of the nation.
Consideration of each of the elements constituting the public interest
leads to but one conclusion-so far as the great majority of strikes is
concerned, it would be contrary to the public interest for the government to intervene in them with any compulsory process to terminate and
settle them. The foregoing analysis may appear to be-and probably
is-a belaboring of the obvious. I have done it, however, in the hope
that I could thus isolate some relevant principles. I have sought some
light in areas uncomplicated by the presence of extreme heat.
Our primary question is whether or not the public interest requires
an attitude toward such strikes as may be deemed to affect health and
safety different from that taken toward all other strikes. Specifically,
should we retain legislation of the type of, though not necessarily containing the same provisions as, Title II of the Taft-Hartley Act 2 dealing
with national emergency strikes? This includes compulsory cooling off
periods, strike ballots, temporary injunctions, etc. Let us apply our
public interest criteria to situations of this type.
First, what of the effect on collective bargaining? In my opinion,
we have a wealth of experience demonstrating the destructive effect of
such mechanisms. The outstanding example is the National War Labor
Board. The former members of that Board would be the first to admit
that the process of collective bargaining suffered substantially during
the war. Both employers and unions went through their preliminary
motions rather perfunctorily, for the most part, fully expecting the case
to land in the lap of the Board. Despite everything the Board could
do, it was quite evident that the parties to disputes very frequently
failed to exhaust the potentialities of collective bargaining before coming to the Board. Also the requirement of the Smith-Connally Acte for
cooling-off periods and strike ballots was universally conceded to be a
complete failure, and one of the reasons was that unions came to use
the strike ballot as part of the process of building, up pressure against
the employers.
I believe the emergency procedures of the Taft-Hartley Act are re261 STAT. 152-156, June 23, 1947, 29 U. S. C. A. §§171-182.
1 57 STAT. 163-168, June 25, 1943, 50 U. S. C. A. App. §§1501-1511.
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peating history. The employers and unions whose activities may fall
within the scope of the law have, to a considerable extent, already made
the expected injunctions part of the bargaining process. The injunction
has become an instrument for building up pressure. It is no exaggeration to say that the very possibility that an injunction may be obtained
becomes a major factor in precipitating the strike. If the parties know
that the calling of a strike or lockout irrevocably throws down the
gauge of battle, they will weigh the alternatives with all the wisdom they
have before taking the final gamble. Qn the other hand, if they believe
that they can be bailed out by an injunction for a period of 80 days, or
any other period, they will be more likely to take the risks of a stoppage,
and will be more intractable in the bargaining process. The result is that
settlements are delayed, the strikes generally occur anyhow, and they
probably last as long as they would had there been no injunction.
In other words, such procedures actually impede the maturation of
the collective bargaining process. This is of particular importance, since
most of the recent serious strikes have occurred in industries where no
real mutual trust has developed. The industry most frequently hit by
injunctions obtained under Title II of the Taft-Hartley Act was the
maritime industry. Collective bargaining in many parts of that industry
has not progressed much beyond the primitive stages. Whatever be the
reasons, it is evident that the parties have little confidence in each other.
The development of such confidence is the sine qua non of industrial
peace.
Second, what of the right to strike? It is said that in these emergency situations it should be recognized that the right to strike and lockout is simply not available to the parties. Consider the consequences of
the formal recognition of such abandonment. In those particular areas
of our economy which require the highest development of the art of
collective bargaining, in order to insure against interruptions of production, the parties will be deprived of the ultimate sanction that gives
meaning to the bargaining process. Furthermore, with rare exceptions,
as between employer and employees, it is only the employees who suffer
by such recognition. They are the ones usually making demands. If
the employer knows in advance that they come only as suppliants, there
is little likelihood of a fair bargain. To say, then, as a general rule, that
the right to strike or lockout cannot be recognized in emergency situations, is, for all practical purposes, to throw the weight of the government on the side of the employers. Aside from any question of the
invasion of democratic rights, the exercise of such favoritism cannot
be considered in the public interest.
Once we are launched on this course, we shall sooner or later be

1949]

NATIONAL EMERGENCY STRIKES

forced into compulsory arbitration. Certainly that will be the resultwhich has already occurred in a few states-if certain types of strikes
are entirely banned. Once compulsory arbitration is adopted for a few
important industries, the effect will be widespread. Once wages are set
for a few key industries, their influence will be felt throughout the
economy. Our postwar experience demonstrated that, when so-called
wage patterns quickly blanketed the country. Under such circumstances,
demand for state control of basic elements of our economy will be
insistent, and irresistible. It appears, then, that the prohibition of, or
even serious limitation on, the right to strike, even in so-called emergency situations, is contrary to the interest of the American people in
the preservation of the basic elements of the free enterprise system.
The interest in the continuity of production or service in these
emergency situations appears to be in conflict with the other three
interests. Does it outweigh the other interests to the extent that we
should conclude that general legislation of the type of Title II of the
Taft-Hartley Act must be continued? The number of these crucial
situations, in toto, has been extremely small, even if we admit, which
I am not willing to do, that every case in which President Truman
invoked the law was one that imperiled the health, safety or welfare of
the country. And remember that our experience of the past three years,
with all the reconversion strains and stresses, cannot be considered normal. The conditions precipitating most of the strikes were peculiar to
a postwar situation and may never recur. Again, what industries are
to be included in the category of industries essential to the safety and
health of the public? Shall it be all public utilities, or only those
national in scope, such as interstate railroads and communications facilities? Shall it be coal and oil? They why not steel? Will not the
threat to health and safety depend on the length of the stoppage?
Assuming we agree on the industries involved, what proportion of an
industry must be stopped before the danger to health and safety arises?
I mention these questions only to indicate the complexity of the problem of definition. Despite all these questions, I do not deny the proposition that there may be strikes or lockouts which, by general agreement,
would fall in the category we are discussing. It does not follow, however, that a general statutory structure should be erected in order to
encompass these rare cases. It is still true that hard cases make bad
.law. The definitions used in any statute must be broad enough to include a wide variety of possibilities. Considering the high development
in this country of propaganda devices and techniques for manufacturing
hysteria, it will be only a short period before the law is applied to
situations not originally contemplated. What starts out as an instru-
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ment devised for use only in crises, becomes a tool employed with
chronic regularity.
In view, then, of all the qualifications that must be interposed concerning the interest in continued production of goods and services essential to the health and safety of the public, taken in conjunction with
the other elements constituting the public interest, I submit that, on
balance, the public interest is opposed to legislation controlling work
stoppages of an emergency nature.
This does not mean that our government must always stand by
impotently, regardless of the gravity of the stoppage and regardless of
the peril to our economy. It does mean that the remedy should be prescribed for the specific case when it arises. It is just as necessary for
the expert to diagnose an acute labor relations disorder before prescribing treatment as it is for a doctor to do the same in regard to a
physical or mental disorder. General rules adopted in advance may be
more than useless-they may be positively harmful. After the expert,
who may be a regular or special government official, has made his diagnosis, a number of alternatives are open: special mediators may be employed; fact-finding boards may be set up, before or after a strike is
called, with or without power to make recommendations; pressures may
be exerted from the White House, etc. In any event, the procedures
used will be ad hoc, crisis measures. The parties to disputes will not
know in advance what to expect.
There is one other method for insuring continuity of production
which I have not mentioned, namely, seizure of the plant or facility involved in the stoppage, and operation by the government. Superficially,
this appears to have a certain advantage over the injunctive process because it cannot be charged that employees are being compelled to work
for a private employer for his profit. Practically, if the war experience
is a safe guide, this would be a fiction, though a legal fiction. Although
the government would be the nominal employer and operator, the personnel of the private employer would continue to work as usual. In
other reslects, the objections to the injunctive process would apply with
equal force to seizure. If there is no method provided for finally settling the dispute, and the working conditions quo ante bellum are maintained, then we have a case where the government has interceded on the
side of the employer and rendered the union impotent. If compulsory
arbitration is provided, then seizure is unnecessary. In short, seizure is
no better answer to the emergency strike than is the injunction.
The formula I have supported in this discussion may sound utterly
unsatisfactory because it is not a formula. It provides no guarantees.
It offers no certainties that crise* can be avoided. It is based on the
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proposition that spectacular failures of collective bargaining are not to
be countered by spectacular displays of force but by more and better
collective bargaining. It is based on the proposition that mature men
will rise to their responsibilities to the community on a voluntary basis
much sooner than under the goad of legal compulsions. It is based,
finally, on the proposition that the preservation of our basic democratic
rights and privileges is worth the payment of a high price.

